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Implied Warranty of Habitability and Security in 
Residential Leases: Trentacost v. Brussel 
A large minority of jurisdictions now recognize an implied 
warranty of habitability in residential leased With one notable 
exception: however, courts have rejected the view that the lease 
agreement imposes a duty upon the landlord to protect his te- 
1. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de- 
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). But cf. 
Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 191 Colo. 344,558 P.2d 563 (1977) (the court sustained the use of 
caveat emptor). For a detailed listing, see Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate: 
A California Case Study, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 37,37 n.1 (1978). In addition, the American 
Law Institute has adopted the implied warranty of habitability as an alternative tenant 
remedy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord and Tenant 38 5.4, 5.5 (1977). 
2. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Kline the 
court found the landlord liable for a tenant's injuries that resulted from a criminal as- 
sault committed in a common hallway. The evidence showed that although substantial 
security precautions existed when the tenant signed the lease, they had deteriorated 
markedly in the seven years preceding her attack. A few commentators have interpreted 
Kline as extending the implied warranty to include a warranty of security. See, e.g., 2 R. 
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ll 234[2], at 367 (P. Rohan ed. 1977); Note, Judi- 
cial Expansion of Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and 
Security in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL . REV. 489,503-04 (1971). However, 
courts in subsequent cases have been reluctant to extend the decision beyond its fact. 
and have ruled that the landlord is obligated to maintain only those precautions in effect 
at the beginning of the lease term. See Bernstein v. District of Colum. Bd. of Zoning 
Adjustment, 376 A.2d 816 (D.C. 1977); Dietz v. Miles Holding Corp., 277 A.2d 108 (D.C. 
1971); Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231 (D.C. 1971). 
California lower courts have flirted in dicta with the concept of an implied warranty 
of security. In Secretary of How. and Urban Dev. v. Layfleld, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 
152 Cal. Rptr. 342 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1978), a landlord brought an unlawful detainer 
action against a tenant who defended on the ground that the landlord had breached an 
implied warranty of habitability failing to provide adequate security. Noting Kline, the 
court said: 
A landlord's duty to provide security measures to protect tenants against 
crime because of his control of the areas of common use in an apartment com- 
plex can be part of the implied warranty of habitability . . . and certainly can 
become a part of the duty owed to tenants by express terms of a lease. 
Id. at 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (footnote omitted). 
In Duarte v. State, 84 Cal. App. 3d 717,-148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978), a wrongful death 
action arising from a murder in a state college dormitory, the court held that the state 
had a contractual duty to protect student residents from criminal attack. However, a 
rehearing was later granted and the judgment was vacated. 88 Cal. App. 3d 473,151 Cal. 
Rptr. 727 (1979). The final opinion made no mention of an implied warranty, and the 
California Supreme Court ordered that the earlier opinion not be officially published. 
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nants from criminal assault? In Trentacost v. Brussel,* the Su- 
preme Court of New Jersey departed from the traditional view 
by holding that an implied warranty of habitability imposes a 
duty on landlords to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal 
activity on leased premises. 
Florence Trentacost was assaulted and seriously injured in 
the common hallway of the apartment complex where she had 
resided for over ten years. The building consisted of eight dwell- 
ing units that were located over street-level stores with access 
from front and rear doors to the common hallway. A padlock 
secured the rear entrance, but there was no lock on the front 
door that was apparently used by both Mrs. Trenacost and her 
as~ailant.~ Mrs. Trentacost brought an action for personal inju- 
ries against her landlord, Dr. Nathan T. Brussel, alleging that he 
had been negligent in maintaining "the safety of the common 
areas of access and egress to [the] building.'" 
The evidence introduced at trial indicated that considerable 
criminal activity, consisting primarily of burglaries, street mug- 
ging~, and other civil disturbances, had taken place in the vicin- 
ity of the apartment complex in the three years preceding the 
assault.' At the close of the presentation of evidence, the judge 
granted plaintiffs motion to strike the contributory negligence 
defense. The jury subsequently awarded the plaintiff $3,000. 
When defendant refused to consent to an additur of $15,000, the 
court granted plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the issue of 
damages. The second jury awarded plaintiff $25,000 and defen- 
dant appealed. 
Noting that the case was one of first impression, the inter- 
mediate appellate court8 ruled in favor of plaintiff by relying ex- 
clusively on negligence concepts, especially the "enhanced risk" 
3. E.g., Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973); 
Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975); Goldberg v. Hous- 
ing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); New York City Hous. Auth. v. 
Medlin, 57 Misc. 2d 145, 291 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Civ. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 64 Misc. 2d 857, 316 
N.Y.S.2d 149 (App. Term 1968); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331, 335 (1972). 
4. 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980). 
5. Id. at 438. 
6. Trentacost v. Brussel, 164 N.J. Super. 9, 12, 395 A.2d 540, 542 (1978). 
7. 412 A.2d at  438. Plaintiff claimed that two months prior to the attack she had 
told the defendant of an attempt to break into the cellar of the building. Defendant, 
however, denied ever having discussed with plaintiff the possibility of placing a lock on 
the front door. Id. a t  437. 
8. 164 N.J. Super. 9, 395 A.2d 540 (1978). 
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doctrine of Braitman v. Overlook Terrace C01-p.~ The court con- 
cluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a jury find- 
ing that the defendant's negligent conduct had created a 
probability, and not merely a possibility, that harm or injury 
might occur to plaintiff.1° 
On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly created 
a new basis for landlord liability. In a four-to-three decision," 
the court characterized Dr. Brussel's failure to place a lock on 
the outside door of the apartment complex as "exemplifying a 
callous disregard for the residents' safety in violation of ordinary 
standards of care"12 and held that sufficient evidence existed to 
make the plaintiffs injuries a foreseeable result of such negli- 
gence." The court also decided to "clarify the scope of a land- 
lord's duty to his tenant" and to "reconsider the general princi- 
ple that the mere relationship of landlord and tenant imposes no 
duty on the landlord to safeguard the tenant from crime."14 
9. 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975). The tenant in Braitman rented an apartment in 
a large, high-rise building that was equipped with only a slip lock. The trial court con- 
cluded that the defendant's negligence in failing to provide adequate locks was the proxi- 
mate cause of the theft that resulted in plaintiffs loss. The appellate c o w  a r m e d ,  
holding that defendant's negligence "unreasonably enhanced the risk or hazard of a 
break-in or robbery." 132 N.J. Super. 51, 52, 332 A.2d 212, 214 (App. Div. 1974). The 
New Jersey Supreme Court also affirmed and suggested that a statutory duty may have 
existed as well. 68 N.J. at 383, 346 A.2d at 84. 
In Trentacost the appellate court found no statutory duty but noted that Braitman 
alluded to a statutory duty only as an "additional source" for the landlord's liability. 164 
N.J. Super. at 14, 395 A.2d at 543. The "enhanced risk" concept was apparently first 
developed in New Jersey in Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (App. 
Div. 1972), where the injured plaintiff was allowed to recover damages from the owner of 
a stolen automobile who had left the keys in the ignition. 
10. 164 N.J. Super. at 14,395 A.2d at 544. The court cited McCappin v. Park Capi- 
tal Corp., 42 N.J. Super. 169,126 A.2d 51 (App. Div. 1956) as support for the foreseeabil- 
ity test. See also Flexmir, Inc. v. Lindeman & Co., 4 N.J. 509, 73 A.2d 243 (1950). 
11. Although the court unanimously e m e d  the Appellate Division's decision in 
favor of Mrs. Trentacost, one justice refused to join in the portion of the opinion ex- 
tending the implied warranty to include security precautions. 412 A.2d at 445 (Pollock, 
J., concurring in part). Two other justices filed a concurring opinion criticizing the exten- 
sion. Id. at 445 (Schreiber, J., concurring in the result; Clifford, J., concurring in the 
result and dissenting in part). 
12. Id. at 441. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (citing Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. at 387, 346 A.2d at 87). 
As justification for this broad examination, the court quoted one of its own opinions: 
[Tlhere is no constitutional mandate that a court may not go beyond what is 
necessary to decide a case at hand. . . . [Tlhe Court may express doubts upon 
existing doctrines, thereby inviting litigation, or may itself raise an issue it 
thinks should be resolved in the public interest, or may deliberately decide 
issues which need not be decided when it believes that course is warranted. 
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Viewing the modern apartment as "a variety of goods and ser- 
vices"16 and noting that the warranty of habitability extended to 
"all facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential pur- 
pose~ , ' ' ~~  the court reasoned: 
Among the "facilities vital to the use of the premises" are the 
provisions for the tenant's security. . . . [Wlithout a minimum 
of security, their well-being is as precarious as if they had no 
heat or sanitation. . . . Under modern living conditions, an 
apartment is clearly not habitable unless it provides a reasona- 
ble measure of security from the risk of criminal intrusion.17 
A concurring justice noted that the question presented to 
the court was a narrow one-whether the landlord had a duty to 
provide a lock for the door that opened into the common access 
area-and argued that traditional tort theory could provide an 
affirmative answer.18 He pointed out that since New Jersey stat- 
utes require residential buildings to be equipped with "heavy 
duty lock sets,"lB noncompliance with the statutes provides an 
injured party with grounds to bring a common-law negligence 
Another justice, dissenting in part, expressly disagreed 
"with the notion that liability can be imposed on the defendant 
landlord on the theory of implied warranty of habitability."21 
While sharing the court's concern for "the harsh realities of 
412 A.2d at 441 (quoting Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 363-64, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (1973), 
appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973)). 
15. 412 A.2d at 442. 
16. Id. at 443 (quoting Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526,534 (1970)). 
17. 412 A.2d at 443. 
18. Id. at 445-46 (Schreiber, J., concurring). 
19. 412 A.2d at 446 (Schreiber, J., concurring). The regulation cited by Justice 
Schreiber provided in pertinent part: 
Security Requirements-Multiple dwellings: Building entrance doors and other 
exterior exit doors shall be equipped with heavy duty lock sets. Latch sets shall 
have stop-work in the inside cylinder controlled by a master key only. Outside 
cylinders of main entrance door locks shall be operated by the tenant's key, 
which shall not be keyed to also open the tenant's apartment entrance door. 
Main entrance door locks shall be kept in the locked position and shall be 
freely openable from the inside at all times. Other exterior exit doors shall be 
locked to prevent entry and shall be freely openable from the inside at all 
times. 
N.J. Admin. Code 5:lO-605.3(f)(2) (current version at N.J. Admin. Code 5:lO-19.6(c)(2)(i) 
(Supp. 1979)). 
20. The justice cited Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 
(1958), as support for this view. 
21. 412 A.2d at 446 (Clifford, J., dissenting in part). 
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modern life,"22 he maintained that the "novel application of the 
implied warranty to the baleful conditions reflected in those re- 
alities [was] unwarranted and ill-ad~ised."~' He further argued 
that the majority's decision "predicate [dl what amount [ed] to 
absolute liability solely upon the relationship between the land- 
lord and tenant and upon loose notions of f~reseeability."~~ 
While it may be logical to argue that an implied warranty of 
habitability will motivate landlords to repair physical defects in 
leased premises, it is illogical to suggest that extension of that 
duty to include security will protect tenants from sudden crimi- 
nal acts of third persons. The duties imposed by the implied 
warranty may only aggravate the poor economic condition of 
many tenants and may worsen the shortage of available urban 
housing. Moreover, the product liability concept of a warranty 
should not be applied to hold landlords strictly liable for the 
intentional acts of third parties. A better solution would be for 
legislatures to determine minimum security standards for multi- 
ple dwellings. This approach would preserve the defenses of con- 
tributory negligence and assumption of risk that are eliminated 
when the warranty theory is applied. Such an approach would 
also better inform tenants and landlords of their legal rights and 
duties. 
It is clear that an apartment without electricity or running 
water may be considered uninhabitable. Furthermore, the failure 
to maintain wiring or plumbing may constitute a breach of an 
implied warranty of habitability. It is not clear, however, 
whether intercom systems, security guards, closed-circuit televi- 
sion monitors or any combination thereof are s a c i e n t  to meet 
the apparent Trentacost duty. New Jersey landlords are being 
obliged by the court to guard against the intentional acts of un- 
known third parties, not disease or cold. The duty of a landlord 
to repair a broken stair or a leaky pipe is altogether distinct 
from a duty to protect against sudden intentional acts of persons 
who commit theft, injury or murder. Although accidental inju- 
ries may occur if the landlord fails to take some physical precau- 
22. Id. 
23. Id. (citing Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d at 76 
(1975)). 
24. 412 A.2d at 446-47 (emphasis added). Citing Kline as support for his view, the 
justice argued that the duty "should not be grounded simply on a special relationship 
between the parties, but rather should arise from the particular circumstances of the 
case, including foreseeability." Id. 
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tion, intentional injuries may occur despite the installation and 
maintenance of security measures.as It is possible that a land- 
lord's use of more sophisticated protection methods will only 
lead to a criminal's use of more sophisticated methods to cir- 
cumvent the security devices.a6 Nevertheless, the only guideline 
the I'rentacost court offers is that landlords must furnish "rea- 
sonable safeguarddm 
The duty imposed by the court is unclear. If the basis for 
the landlord's duty was contractual, then the underlying obliga- 
tion was implied in the lease, and the standard that Mrs. 
Trentacost relied upon for over ten years was the measure of the 
duty.s8 However, if the alleged liability was grounded in negli- 
gence, then the reasonable person or community standard test 
would define the duty? Unfortunately, in resorting to a war- 
ranty theory the Trentacost court did nothing to clarify the 
duty it was placing on landlords. 
A more logical and equitable approach to the problem than 
imposition of a warranty theory is for legislatures to define mini- 
mum standards of security for multiple dwellings. The 
I'rentacost court cited violations of the state multiple dwelling 
code as evidence of defendant's negligences0 and noted that it 
was "entirely appropriate to consider the landlord's statutory 
25. See 1971 L. & Soc. ORD. 612, 625. 
26. Id. 
27. 412 A.2d at  443. In Kline the court employed a community standard test to 
determine whether "reasonable care under the circumstances" had been observed: 
"[The] standard of protection may be taken as that commonly provided in apartments of 
this character and type in this community, and this is a reasonable standard of care on 
which to judge the conduct of the landlord here." 439 F.2d at 486. Presumably a landlord 
who is sued in an action for negligence could escape liability by showing his security 
precautions to be equivalent to those of surrounding buildings. In slum areas, such pre- 
cautions could well be nonexistent. 
In Trentacost the court implied that the crime level in the surrounding area was an 
important factor to consider. 412 A2d at  441. Trentacost is further distinguished from 
Kline in that Kline relied heavily on evidence documenting the occurrence of prior 
crimes within the apartment building. Aside from the single attempted break-in alluded 
to by plainti& there was no other evidence of crimes having been committed within the 
Trentacost apartment building. 
28. Although the facts do not reveal the terms of Mrs. Trentacost's lease, it is argua- 
ble that she had ratified the level of security by continuing to pay rent when the defecta 
were well-known to her. See also Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d at  492 
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
29. For a similar criticism of the Kline decision, see Note, Landlord-Tenant Law: 
Landlord Held Negligent for Criminal Assault by Third Party Intruder on Tenant, 55 
MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1106 (1971). 
30. 412 A.2d at 44-45, 
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and administrative responsibilities to his  tenant^."^' However, 
the court held that this was only an "alternative ground"32 for 
defendant's liability; both concurring justices, on the other hand, 
found it the only appropriate basis.3s 
In contrast to the vague standard of "reasonable safe- 
guards" set forth in the instant case, a definitive statutory 
scheme would provide a more precise standard for judges and 
juries to use when determining the scope of the landlord's duty. 
The legislature "by reason of its organization and investigating 
processes is generally in a better position to establish such tests 
than [is] the judiciary."" Moreover, the legislature would un- 
doubtedly consider the economic implications of such standards 
and perhaps would appropriate assistance to low-income areas 
or offer tax abatements to the affected properties. Most impor- 
, 
tantly, under statutory law the chances are greater that tenants 
would be more aware of their specific rights and that landlords 
would have notice of their specific duties. 
An additional benefit of the statutory approach is that the 
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk 
would remain available; proximate cause, however, would still 
have to be shown." Although each state is free to adopt its own 
standard of statutory scrutiny, the majority of statesM now hold 
that an unexcused violation of a statutory duty is conclusive on 
the issue of negligence and "jurors have not dispensing power by 
which to relax it."87 
The court inaccurately assumes that landlords can afford 
additional security precautions because of their ability to 
31. Id. at 444. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 445-47. (Schrieber & Clifford, JJ., concurring). 
34. Rudes v. Gottachalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959). 
35. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 36, at  201 (4th ed. 1971). 
36. Id. at 200. 
37. Martin v. Henog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) (Cardozo, J.). Ironically, 
violation of a statutory duty in New Jersey is not conclusive on the issue of negligence. 
Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 385, 346 A.2d 76, 85 (1975). In the 
landlordltenant context, the Supreme Court of New Jersey referred to the Tenement 
House Act and said: 
Our statute does not expressly authorize a suit by one injured by reason of a 
landlord's violation and hence does not create a statutory cause of action as 
that term is understood. Rather, in harmony with our usual approach to stat- 
utes of this kind, the act is deemed to establish a standard of conduct, and to 
permit the intended beneficiaries to rely upon a negligent failure to meet that 
standard in a common law action for negligence. 
Michaels v. Bookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 386, 140 A.2d 199, 203 (1958). 
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"spread the cost of [maintaining property] over an extended pe- 
riod of time among all residents enjoying its benefits."s8 Al- 
though it may be true that a landlord is the "superior risk 
bearer" in the lessor-lessee relationship, the landlord's ability to 
pay for security expenses seldom exceeds his tenant's rental pay- 
ments. To conclude otherwise is to assume that most landlords 
enjoy healthy profit margins. Strong evidence, however, refutes 
the assumption that urban landlords reap large profits. A 1968 
survey of New York City's landlordsm indicated that approxi- 
mately 73% had incomes of $10,000 or less40 and concluded that 
"the limited availability of resources for capital improvement is 
evident."41 Another study" revealed that among the landlords 
surveyed, 43% owned only one apartment b~ilding,'~ 45% were 
either blue-collar or retired:4 and 36% resided on the rental 
property," presumably exposing themselves to the same dangers 
as their tenants. The imposition of vague security duties on 
landlords, in addition to increasing maintenance costs, would as- 
suredly accelerate insurance premiums and legal expenses. If 
such costs rendered apartment buildings unprofitable, landlords 
would be forced to sell or even abandon rental properties. The 
abandonment or conversion of rental properties to other uses 
would further exacerbate the r e n d  housing shortage lamented 
by the court.46 
38. 412 A.2d at 442. The Kline opinion, cited by the Trentacost majority, noted that 
the landlord "is entirely justified in passing on the cost of increased protective measures 
to his tenants." 439 F.2d at 488. However, further expansion of the landlord's duties may 
exacerbate the "chronic desperate need for rental housing," id. at 442, which in turn has 
led to an "inequality of bargaining power between landlord and tenant." Reste Realty 
Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969). 
39. G. STERNLEB, THE URBAN HOUSING DILEMMA (1972). 
40. Id. at 467. 
41. Id. 
42. G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD (1969). The information for this survey 
was gathered in Newark, New Jersey, not far from the apartment complex in the instant 
case. See generally G. STBRNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TEN- 
EMENT LANDLORD h s m  (1973). 
43. G. STERNLEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 122 (1969). 
44. Id. at 130. 
45. Id. at 131, 134. The court ignores the landlord's self-interest in securing his 
property. Moreover, it is logical that this interest is highest among those who reside in 
the building themselves. 
46. See, e.g., Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability a d  the American Law Insti- 
tute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1975). Some studies indicate that the imposition of an im- 
plied warranty of habitability has had little effect on the availability of rental housing. 
See, e.g., fieskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate: A California Case Study, 66 
CALIF. L. REV. 37 (1978); Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of  Habit- 
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After partially justifying the economic impact of its decision 
by referring to the ability of the lessor to "spread his costs,"47 
the court lauded local government bodies that "have adopted 
rent control ordinances to prevent unregulated economic forces 
from depriving citizens of decent shelter."4s Such logic demon- 
strates the court's limited understanding of the financial burden 
its decision places upon landlords and tenants. The persons least 
able to bear the added security costs will be those who suffer the 
most, since statistics reveal that crime is highest in the poorest 
neighborho~ds.~~ 
The added expenses incidental to the Trentacost duty, far 
from improving the average tenant's condition, may actually 
contribute to the reduction of urban housing.'O Although the 
court deplores the fact that modern landlordltenant relatonships 
are often "contracts of adhe~ion,"~' it removes contractual free- 
dom by imposing implied warranties that increase tenant costs. 
Tenants may well prefer "non-secure" housing they can afford 
to "secure" housing that they cannot afford.52 
The policy questions raised when plaintiff-tenants offen- 
sively use the implied warranty must also be e~amined.'~ One of 
ability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 729 (1976). However, these surveys cannot show the 
real impact of extending the warranty to include security precautions, since California 
does not recognize such a warranty. Moreover, the surveys were conducted the year fol- 
lowing recognition by California of the warranty of habitability when few tenants were 
aware of the ruling. In addition the economic impact of the implied warranty on the 
housing marketspecifically the potential for diiinvestment-cannot be shown in the 
short term. 
47. 412 A.2d at 442, 444. 
48. Id. at  444. 
49. "One of the most fully documented facts about crime is that the common serious 
crimes . . . happen most often in the slums of large cities." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION O  
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 35 (1967); G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, supra note 42, at xx, 160. 
50. G. STBRNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, supra note 42, at  xx. 
51. 412 k 2 d  at  442. 
52. If the "superior risk bearer" justification is taken to its logical limits, it may be 
argued that the best entity to bear the costa of criminal activity is the government. How- 
ever, in contrast to the security duties imposed upon private landlords by the court, 
many governmental bodies are immune from liability for failure to provide adequate po- 
lice protection. E.g., Cu.  GOV'T CODE g 845 (West). "Neither a public entity nor a public 
employee is liabile for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide po- 
lice protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide 
sufficient police protection service." Id. 
53. While some jurisdictions have adopted the implied warranty in cases where the 
tenant brought an action against the landlord, e-g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426,462 
P.2d 470 (1969) (tenant sought recovery of expenses from landlord for repairs); Garcia v. 
Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972) (tenant 
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the benefits to New Jersey tenants under Trentacost is that they 
may now bring actions to compel landlords to install security 
devices prior to injury or theft." To the extent that Trentacost 
benefits tenants who are willing to bear the additional rent nec- 
essary to obtain more secure dwellings, the decision serves a just 
purpose, whether used offensively in seeking specific perform- 
ance or defensively in a wrongful detainer action. 
However, a more significant implication of the expanded 
duty is the use of a warranty theory to overcome the traditional 
tort requirement that a defendant either have knowledge that a 
defect exists or have a special relationship with the plaintiff." 
Although the Trentacost court ignored the "special relation- 
ship" issue, it explicitly declared that a landlord need not have 
notice of an unsafe or defective condition in order to be held 
liable." The court held that liability can be found where a land- 
lord does "not take measures which [are] in fact reasonable for 
maintaining a habitable residen~e."~~ By applying the warranty 
principle, the court actually imposed strict liability on the land- 
sought termination of lease), the warranty is most often invoked as a defense to a land- 
lord's action for rent. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 
1970); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473,462 P.2d 482 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant 
§ 5.4, provides remedies that include rent abatement, repair and deduct, rent withhold- 
ing and limited consequential damages. 
54. Prior to Trentacost the warranty was not recognized in tort for personal injuries 
that were intentionally inflicted. Contract damages are designed primarily to protect the 
expectation interest of the promisee, thereby providing him with the benefit of his bar- 
gain as intended by the parties. Famaworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147-49 (1970). Contract damages are prospective; they are 
designed to place the aggrieved party in the same position he would have been in had the 
breach not occurred. In contrast, tort damages are.compensatory, awarded to place the 
injured party in the position he occupied before the occurrence of the tort. W. PROSSER, 
supra note 35, 95, at 634. 
55. At common law no individual was under a duty to protect another from criminal 
attack absent some "special relationship" between the parties. These relationships in- 
cluded landownerlinvitee, common carrierlpassenger, innkeeperlguest, employerlem- 
ployee, jailer1 prisoner, hospitallpatient, schoollpupil, and in some areas, parentlchild. 
W. PROSSER, supra note 35, 98 56, 124. The Restatement (Second) of Torts includes 
most of these categories, but notes, "[tlhe duty in each case is only one to exercise rea- 
sonable care under the circumstances. The defendant . . . is not required to take precau- 
tions against a sudden attack from a third person which he has no reason to anticipate 
. . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 314A, Comment e (1965). The Trentacost 
court could simply have extended the innkeeperlguest relationship by analogy to include 
landlordltenant, as was suggested in Kline. 439 F.2d at  482-83. 
56. 412 A.2d at  443. 
57. Id. 
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lord for injuries inflicted by a criminal intruder.58 
Moreover, a showing of proximate cause is no longer re- 
quired under Trentacost. Prosser notes that under a warranty 
theory, "[tlhe issue is not one of causation . . . but of whether 
the defendant was under any duty to protect the plaintiff 
against the intervening cause. Once that question is answered in 
the affirmative, nothing whatever remains to be said."" In addi- 
tion, the warranty theory does not require the plaintiff to show 
foreseeability. Since courts may interpret a breach of warranty 
to be negligence per se?O the ultimate effect of the Trentacost 
decision is to make the landlord the actual insurer of the ten- 
ant's safety. 
Finally, the court's application of products liability concepts 
to impose liability on landlords for the criminal acts of others is 
both ill-founded and ill-advised.61 The landlord is not engaged 
in the mass production of a product to be placed in the stream 
of commerce with exposure to large numbers of consumers. His 
"product" is often in use long before he purchases it. He is whol- 
ly unlike the manufacturer or builder who has the ability to rea- 
sonably assure that a product leaves his hands in a safe condi- 
tion. Although the implied warranty of habitability might serve 
58. "Whether it be tort or contract, a breach of warranty gives rise to strict liability, 
which does not depend upon any knowledge of defects on the part of the seller, or any 
negligence." W. PROSSER, supra note 35, 3 95, at 636 (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
59. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 401 (1950) (em- 
phasis added). Contra, Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976). "Finding a 
duty and its breach is not conclusive of actionable negligence. Proximate (legal) causa- 
tion is also a vital element of negligence, especially in relating the potential superseding 
cause of third party criminal activity to a breach of duty by the landlord." 278 Md. at 
171, 359 A.2d at 555. 
60. This is precisely the case in New Jersey: 
[I]t has been said over and over again that this warranty-if that is the name 
for it--is not the old sales warranty, it is not the warranty covered by the 
Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial Code. It is not a warranty of 
the seller to the buyer at all, but it is something separate and distinct which 
sounds in tort exclusively, and not at all in contract; which exists apart from 
any contract between the parties; and which makes for strict liability in tort. 
Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 141, 238 A.2d 169, 174-75 (1968) (quot- 
ing Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General, 36 CLEV. B.A.J. 149, 
167-68 (1965)). 
61. The court warned of the inherent weaknesses in such an analogy in Dwyer v. 
Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd mem., 
63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973). As noted earlier, the average landlord's ability to spread 
the risk of liability among numerous "consumers" is limited. The Dwyer opinion was 
clearly overruled sub silentio in Trentacost. 
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as a positive incentive to create more habitable units, it should 
not be applied to an intentional act committed by a third party. 
Even under the strict liability theory, a manufacturer should not 
be held liable when a third party's criminal misuse of his prod- 
uct injures an~ther.~' 
The warranty approach imposes strict liability on landlords 
and eliminates traditional tort concepts that allow a defendant 
to show that his conduct was reasonable under the circum- 
stances. It removes from the trier of fact the right to evaluate all 
of the facts, including the plaintiffs knowledge of any defects? 
The ends of justices are better served when the test to deter- 
mine landlord liability considers (1) whether the landlord, as a 
reasonably prudent person, realized or should have realized that 
his acts or omissions involved an unreasonable risk of criminal 
harm to his tenants," or (2) whether he has complied with the 
statutory security requirements governing leased residential 
property. 
Daniel M. Livingston 
62. See RESTA~MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, Comment n (1965). Under the 
strict liability theory, a manufacturer will not be held liable where the injury results 
from "abnormal handling" of the product. Id. Although 5 402A does not explicitly ad- 
dress the criminal misuse issue, it would be highly illogical to assume that a section 
proscribing liability for "abnormal handling" implies that a manufacturer may be found 
liable where the product is criminally misused. 
63. In Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the 
court held that the District of Columbia Housing Regulations created "a duty of care 
which the appellant [tenant] owes to herself." Id. at 950. "[Rlecovery would be barred if 
. . . the tenant unreasonably exposed herself to danger by failing to vacate the premises 
. . . ." Id. The court emphasized that a tenant's knowledge of a defect is relevant to the 
determination of contributory negligence. Although the Restatement disallows contribu- 
tory negligence as a defense, it does allow an assumption of risk defense: "If the user or 
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds 
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recov- 
ery." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 402A, Comment n (1965). The language of this 
section highlights the inapplicability of products liability law to the landlord/tenant rela- 
'tionship. F,urthermore, even if the application were proper, the Trentacost court acts 
counter to the Restatement position by denying the assumption of risk defense. 
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 5 302B (1965). 
